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The use of malware as a means of obtaining evidence 
has increased in the course of the past years due to its 
effectiveness to counter the anti-forensic measures 
adopted by cyber criminals. In Portugal, it appears 
that this investigative tool was inserted in the 
Cybercrime Law as a technological device to be used 
in undercover operations. However, the terms in 
which this provision was foreseen lack clarity, 
precision and most of all respect for the defendant’s 
rights, thus raising doubts as to its constitutionality. 
This paper discusses the implications of this 
legislation. The topic is extensive, and certain 
important areas are not covered, such as: the issue of 
national reach beyond its borders, and the reliability 
of the evidence. These are topics for another paper. 
Introduction: The problem 
On 15 September 2009, Lei n.º 109/2009 de 15 de 
setembro (Law no. 109 of 15 September 2009), also 
known as the Cybercrime Law, was published in the 
Portuguese Official gazette.1 In addition to the 
transposition into the national legal order of Council 
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 
2005 on attacks against information systems,2 and 
adapting the national law to the Convention on 
Cybercrime,3 the Cybercrime Law also created a 
procedural mechanism that was never explained and 
whose meaning remains unclear. 
The Commission for Constitutional Affairs, Rights, 
Freedoms and Guarantees of the Portuguese 
Parliament did not refer to the provision in question 
in its motion upon the Draft Bill 289/X (4th), which 
would later become the Cybercrime Law. The 
Portuguese Parliament approved it without any 
dissenting vote, the decisions of the higher courts – as 
far as we know – have never referred to it, and those 
that write on these subjects rarely mention it, limiting 
                                                          
1 D.R. n.º 179 (Serial I), of 15 September 2009. 
2 OJ L 69, 16.3.2005, 67–71. 
3 Council of Europe, Budapest, 23.XI.2001. 
themselves, if ever, to transcribing it or questioning its 
reach. 
This procedural mechanism is included in the last 
number of the last article of the chapter dedicated to 
the procedural provisions of the Cybercrime Law, 
article 19, under the title ‘Acções encobertas’ 
(undercover operations). Paragraph 2 states the 
following: 
Sendo necessário o recurso a meios e 
dispositivos informáticos observam-se, 
naquilo que for aplicável, as regras previstas 
para a intercepção de comunicações. 
Rules on interception of communications shall 
apply, as appropriate, where the resort to 
computer means and devices is required.4 
The analysis of this provision immediately elicits the 
need to know what the ‘computer means and devices’ 
refer to. Is it possible that, as Paulo Dá Mesquita 
suggests, ‘through this path, one is opening, without 
enough weighing (or clear brakes) the door to 
intercepting communications for prevention 
purposes’.5 Or is it that the reference included in this 
provision to the application of the ‘rules on 
interception of communications’ aims precisely to 
remove these ‘computer means and devices’ from the 
concept of interception of communications provided 
in article 18 of the Cybercrime Law? This would qualify 
them as a means of obtaining evidence that is merely 
analogous to the interception but not an interception. 
The ‘means’ in question would require the use of 
other technologies, perhaps of a more invasive 
nature. Such an understanding would place upon the 
interpreter – meaning the jurist that does not have a 
significant knowledge of technology – a difficulty in 
understanding the legal meaning of ‘computer means 
and devices’. A difficulty that tends to be dismissed as 
belonging to the knowledge of technical concepts 
                                                          
4 Translation of the Cybercrime Law is taken from 
http://www.anacom.pt/ . 
5 Paulo Dá Mesquita, Processo Penal, Prova e Sistema Judiciário 
(Coimbra: Wolters Kluwer, 2010), 127. Translation by the author. 
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commonly understood as exterior to law and 
considered exempt from legal interpretation.6 
The question this provision elicits is far from being 
uncontroversial, and it will set the theme for the 
present study: whether the use of malware as a 
means of obtaining evidence in criminal proceedings 
is admissible in light of the current Portuguese legal 
and constitutional framework.7 
As can be inferred from this question, the problem is 
twofold: on the one hand, it is necessary to search for 
the possible existence of legal grounds in the current 
legal framework to support the use of these means of 
obtaining evidence, particularly in respect of the 
provision of article 19 (2) of the Cybercrime Law. On 
the other hand, it is necessary to analyse the 
constitutional framing of the use of malware, thus 
seeking to assess the requirements and assumptions 
of its application in criminal procedures, as well as its 
conformity with the Constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic. 
This article provides a brief understanding of the 
problem, while presenting our first – and thus 
preliminary – thoughts on this subject. 
                                                          
6 On this subject, see Denise H. Wong, ‘Educating for the future: 
teaching evidence in the technological age’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013), 16 – 24; Deveral 
Capps, ‘Fitting a quart into a pint pot: the legal curriculum and 
meeting the requirements of practice’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013), 23 – 28. Also, for an 
introduction for legal practitioners on the relevant concepts of digital 
evidence, see Stephen Mason, gen ed., Electronic Evidence (3rd 
edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012), Chapter 1. 
7 If we replace the generic term malware with the term Trojan horse, 
we will inevitably conclude that this question could have been 
answered in the parliamentary debate on the general principles 
pertaining to the Draft Bill 289/X (4th). In fact, immediately after the 
beginning of the parliamentary debate on the Draft Bill, Fernando 
Negrão, from the Social-Democratic Party, asked the following 
question: ‘why is it not contemplated in this bill the possibility for the 
criminal investigation authorities to introduce in a given computer 
system under investigation what we might call “technical Trojan 
horse” in order to gather continuous and live information, thus 
facilitating criminal investigations, namely by means of computer 
systems?’. Having failed to receive any answer, at the closing of the 
debate on the general principles pertaining to this Bill, the same 
Member asked the following question: ‘Mr. President, just to reiterate 
the questions that I posed to which Mr. Secretary of State did not 
answer […] Secondly, I asked the following: why not the creation of 
a new type of legal crime that would facilitate the criminal 
investigation in order to introduce technical “Trojan horses” in 
computer systems so as to facilitate the criminal investigation? I 
would just like to record that Mr. Secretary of State did not answer 
any of these questions’. The President of the Assembly of the 
Republic answered in the following terms: ‘Mr. Secretary of State no 
longer has time to answer. Maybe he can do it some other time, 
perhaps during the course of the debate on the details, if so’. During 
the debate on the details, as far as we know, this question was 
never raised and this provision was approved by the majority, 
including the Social-Democratic Party: Parliament Gazette, 27 July 
2009, 2nd ser., section A, No. 167/X/4. 
The use of malware as a means of 
obtaining digital evidence 
For an appropriate framing of the problem, we have 
chosen a two-step analysis of the subject: the first 
phase will include a brief historical and comparative 
analysis on the use of malware as a means of 
obtaining digital evidence in three selected legal 
systems in order to provide an empirical overview and 
a factual framing of the problem; the second phase 
will be limited to a legal study on a national level. 
As for the first phase, we shall begin with a brief 
analysis of the use of malware as a means of obtaining 
evidence in the United States of America, where, as 
far as we know, it first emerged as a supporting tool 
for criminal investigations. We will conduct a brief 
analysis of the German experience with particular 
focus on the decision of the Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) addressing the use 
of malware and on the functioning of what is 
commonly called the Bundestrojaner. Thirdly, we will 
proceed to summarise the Spanish legal framework, 
where a Draft Code of Criminal Procedure expressly 
including the admissibility of this technology is 
currently under discussion. This phase will end by 
considering the tendency to permit the use of 
malware as a criminal investigation tool through the 
influence of supranational initiatives, particularly in 
the countries of the Caribbean, as well as in the 
European Union. 
The second phase of this article offers a summary 
study of the legal provisions at the Portuguese 
criminal procedural level for the use of malware – 
namely of article 19 (2) of the Cybercrime Law –, 
including the analysis of the sufficiency of the 
provisions already established by law and some of 
their main constitutional problems. 
Concepts 
For a proper understanding of the reality of 
cybercrime and digital evidence, it is acknowledged 
that, with the advent of the internet and the 
technological evolution, new realities have emerged 
that no longer fall into existing legal concepts. When 
this happens, a methodological option needs to be 
made; either pre-existing concepts are adapted in 
order to cover the new realities – with the possible 
distortion of its initial meaning through the fading of 
its features – or new concepts are imported from 
other areas of knowledge and given a legal definition. 
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The legislator and the Portuguese doctrine are usually 
prone to the first of these options. Though the 
Cybercrime Law is in general an exception to this 
tendency, it is not totally immune to it. This is partially 
shown by the option made by the Portuguese 
legislator to uncritically submit the undercover 
operations in a digital environment to the general 
legal framework of undercover operations established 
in Law 101/2001, of 25 August.8 As to the doctrine, 
the same tendency is made manifest, namely by the 
use of the term ‘online search’9 in order to qualify 
what is, strictly speaking, the use of malware as a 
secret method of criminal investigation.10 
For the purpose of this article, given that we 
understand that we are before a new concept that 
deserves detachment from other concepts with 
different features and objectives, we have chosen to 
use the term malware or one of its categories,11 and 
not the terms online search or remote search12 – 
except where the use of these terms may be 
necessary. We have done so essentially for two 
reasons: because it is not a search (busca) in the sense 
given to it by Portuguese Criminal Procedure Code, for 
it does not occur in a physical environment; and 
secondly because its installation and use is not limited 
to an online context. 
Regarding the first objection, the generic reference to 
the concept of search without any reference to the 
term ‘house’ or ‘domicile’, might lead to the 
                                                          
8 Lei n.º 101/2001, de 25 de Agosto. 
9 Manuel da Costa Andrade, in one of his many notable works on 
secret methods of criminal investigation, defines online searches as 
‘a comprehensive and broad concept, perhaps not entirely accurate, 
that amounts to a set of encroachments in computer systems, 
performed through the internet, that are updated in the observation, 
search, copy, vigilance, etc., of the data stored in those computer 
systems’: “Bruscamente no Verão passado” a Reforma do Código 
de Processo Penal – Observações Críticas sobre uma Lei que Podia 
e Devia ter sido Diferente (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2009), 166. 
Translation by the author. 
10 In Portugal, the term ‘search’ may be translated into the terms 
‘busca’, ‘revista’ and ‘pesquisa’. The first term refers to a search in a 
closed environment or in a space that is not freely accessible to the 
public, according to article 174 (2) of the Portuguese Criminal 
Procedure Code. The second term refers to a body search, to be 
performed whenever there is reason to believe that someone is 
hiding on his/her person any objects related to a crime which may be 
used as evidence, in accordance with article 174 (1) of the 
Portuguese Criminal Procedure Code. The third term is used for the 
search of computer data in article 15 of the Cybercrime Law. When 
the term ‘online search’ is used in Portuguese language it is said to 
be a ‘busca online’, which is, in our opinion, technically inaccurate. 
11 Such as Trojans, logic bombs, rootkits, spyware, virus, worms or 
blended threats. 
12 The concept of a remote search is not established in Portuguese 
law or doctrine. 
conclusion that the public prosecutor can authorize 
such a search in accordance with article 174 of the 
Código de Processo Penal (Portuguese Criminal 
Procedure Code). If this is accepted, it may be used to 
exempt the use of malware from judicial 
authorization. On the other hand, if the online search 
is compared with a house search13 – which we find to 
be destitute of technical acuity –, the result will 
inevitably be a mischaracterization of the concept of 
‘house’ or ‘domicile’. This failure extends to the 
elements that underlie and legally justify the 
increased protection given to the suspect’s (or others) 
rights affected by this measure14 – especially if we 
take into consideration that malware can be set up in 
mobile telephones, laptops or tablets, wherever these 
are found, both inside the suspect’s house or 
somewhere else. Furthermore, in an online search, 
the investigator can monitor all of the suspect’s 
activity in real time, while also having the ability of 
activating, if necessary, the computer system’s 
webcam or microphone, thus being able to witness 
the practice of unlawful acts while they are being 
perpetrated without the suspect being aware of it – 
contrary to what is the case with a search in a physical 
environment. 
In regard to the second of the objections for qualifying 
the use of malware as an online search, some cyber-
espionage malware such as Flame and Stuxnet15 
demonstrate that the installation of this type of 
software can occur offline by means of infected 
removable drives – namely USB flash drives – 
programmed to seize the intended data in order to 
                                                          
13 On this subject, after comparing the computer to a person’s digital 
soul, Benjamim Silva Rodrigues refers to the idea of digital domicile 
for the purpose of online searches – Da Prova Penal – 
Bruscamente… A(s) Face(s) Oculta(s) dos Métodos Ocultos de 
Investigação Criminal, 6 vols. (2010-2011, Lisboa: Rei dos Livros), 
vol. 2 (2010), 472 – 473. 
14 On this subject, Costa Andrade, comments that ‘In any case it is 
without controversy that it [the online search] is not covered by any 
of the criminal procedure provisions that allow for the violation of the 
domicile, within the context of the classic figure of the search 
[busca]’, 168. 
15 Given that these are cyber-espionage tools that are outside of the 
scope of this study (as are Duqu or Gauss), they will not be 
considered. For an interesting analysis of Stuxnet, see the 
compilation of information performed by the Federal Department of 
Homeland Security Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (ICS CERT), available at https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-10-272-01 . For a brief analysis of Flame 
and Stuxnet, see K. F. Morton and David Grace, A Case Study on 
Stuxnet and Flame Malware (2012), 
http://vixra.org/pdf/1209.0040v1.pdf. Finally, for an explanation and 
comparison between Flame, Stuxnet, Gauss and Duqu, see Will 
Gradigo, Daniel Molina, John Pirc and Nick Selby, Blackhatonomics 
– An Inside Look at the Economics of Cybercrime (Syngress, 2013), 
47 – 52. 
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carry them to another removable drive until it finally 
reaches a computer system connected to the internet, 
from which it will be sent to its controller. 
Finally, attention should be paid to the fact that, as far 
as we know, the term ‘online search’ has its origin in 
the debate that took place in American courts on the 
application of the concept of search provided for in 
the Fourth Amendment to the use of malware for 
criminal investigation purposes, namely for the 
purpose of requiring a prior judicial order authorizing 
its use.16 Even though this debate has been repeated 
in a similar manner in different legal systems, such as 
Germany, the term loses relevance once we step into 
the Portuguese constitutional lexicon and, as such, 
should be subject to an independent analysis, 
removed from the value and configuration that is 
given to it by other legal systems, as well as from the 
concept of ‘house’ or domicile’.17 For all of these 
reasons we will henceforth refer to the use of 
malware as a means of obtaining evidence, instead of 
the concept of online search. 
Origin and evolution of the use of 
malware as a means of obtaining 
evidence in criminal proceedings 
The North-American experience: from Magic 
Lantern to CIPAV 
The American experience has been of interest with 
regard to the use of malware as a means of obtaining 
                                                          
16 This question was initially raised on the subject of the interception 
of telephone calls, whose subjection to the Fourth Amendment was 
established by the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United 
States 389 U.S. 347, for which see Susan Landau, Surveillance or 
Security – The risks Posed by new Wiretapping Technologies (MIT 
Press, 2011), 70, and Iñaki Saiz Garitaonandia ‘La intervención de 
las comunicaciones en el derecho comparado: los casos de Francia 
e los Estados Unidos de America’, in Derecho Penal Informático 
(Pamplona: Thomson Reuters, 2010), 321 – 345, 337 – 339. The 
problem would be reawakened with the advent of the interception of 
communications and the use of malware in the context of criminal 
investigations, and would be settled in a similar manner than phone 
tapping – Susan Brenner, ‘Law, Dissonance and Remote Computer 
Searches’, 14 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 43 (2012), 43 – 92, 81. 
17 Unless, like Buermeyer we could conclude that by entering 
someone’s computer system the state is setting its virtual foot 
through the door of someone’s house for which see Costa Andrade, 
167. Due attention should be paid to the fact that on 31 January 
2007, the BGH rejected the position adopted by some German 
authors that the online searches could be subject to the rules 
applicable to traditional searches and entries: Juan Carlos Ortiz 
Pradillo, ‘Remote Forensic Software as a Tool for Investigating 
Cases of Terrorism’, ENAC – E-newsletter on the fight against 
cybercrime, 4 (2009), 1 – 8, 3 
http://polis.osce.org/library/f/3643/2779/NGO-ESP-RPT-3643-EN-
2779 . 
digital evidence in criminal proceedings. The secret 
use of different types of malware by the police has 
been the topic of interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution. However, this article does not provide 
an analysis of this topic. 
The first case to be subjected to widespread media 
attention on the use of keyloggers by the police dates 
from January 1999 (though, in this case, it was both 
malware and malicious hardware), when, as part of a 
criminal investigation conducted by the FBI on 
Nicodemo S. Scarfo, an alleged member of a mafia 
organization suspected of criminal offences related to 
the management of an illegal gambling business. The 
FBI discovered that a substantial part of the files with 
potential evidential value were encrypted.18 
Given the need to obtain such data, and since the 
data encrypted by the software used by the suspect 
could only be decrypted with the password (perhaps 
known only by the suspect himself), the FBI sought a 
new warrant, this time to introduce a keylogger 
directly on the suspect’s computer, in order to 
capture the password19 and send it via radio waves to 
the FBI. The warrant was obtained and the keylogger, 
in this case in the form of hardware and software, was 
physically installed between the suspect’s keyboard 
and his computer. After two months20 the password21 
was finally obtained,22 thus allowing the FBI to arrest 
the suspect and decrypt the contents of the files.23 
The understandable practical difficulties raised by the 
physical installation of keyloggers in computers 
suspected of being used for the purpose of engaging 
                                                          
18 The facts are set out in United States v Scarfo, 180 F.Supp.2d 572 
(D.N.J. 2001). 
19 Statement from the FBI agent who requested the issuance of the 
warrant, describing the operation of the keylogger and other relevant 
information, available at: http://epic.org/crypto/scarfo/murch_aff.pdf . 
20 Angela Murphy, ‘Cracking the Code to Privacy: How Far Can the 
FBI Go?’, 1 Duke Law & Technology Review, 1 – 6 (2002). 
21 The password turned out to be NDS09813-050, Scarfo’s father’s 
prison identification number, for which see George Mohay, Alison 
Anderson, Byron Collie, Olivier De Vel and Rodney McKemmish, 
Computer and Intrusion Forensics (Massachusetts: Artech House, 
2003), 120. 
22 To avoid violations of the Wiretap Act (18 U.S. Code § 2511 – 
Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications prohibited), this keylogger only worked when the 
computer was disconnected from the internet, for which see Michael 
Sheetz, Computer Forensics: An Essential Guide for Accountants, 
Lawyers, and Managers (Wiley, 2007), 142. 
23  It should be noted, however, that a plea bargaining agreement 
prevented a thorough appellate consideration. The documents 
relating to this case are available here: 
http://epic.org/crypto/scarfo.html . 
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in criminal activity, along with the increasing severity 
and international scope of crime, had heightened the 
sense of need to install such mechanisms remotely 
and without hardware. 
Thus, in 2001, Magic Lantern arose. It was a keylogger 
that could be installed surreptitiously and remotely 
via the internet at a specific computer system – even 
if it was not physically located in the U.S. – when it 
belonged to individuals suspected of being related to 
criminal activities, in particular of a terrorist nature. 
Magic Lantern could be installed either by opening 
attachments in e-mail messages sent to the suspect’s 
computer system, or through the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities in the operating systems.24 However, 
since certain anti-virus programs could detect Magic 
Lantern, it is reported that the U.S. government 
requested some companies devoted to marketing 
these products to avoid interfering with Magic 
Lantern.25 
Magic Lantern would be replaced by the Computer 
and Internet Protocol Address Verifier (CIPAV),26 a 
type of malware that added to the list of collected 
information, among others, the IP address and MAC 
address or both of the suspect’s computer system, as 
well as his or her location, the list of programs running 
at any given time, the operating system used (type, 
version and serial number), the user account logged in 
the target computer, and the last web site visited.27 
Although there are reports of its use dating back to 
2001, the CIPAV would only come to light in 2007, 
when the media published an application for a 
warrant submitted by FBI Special Agent Norman 
Sanders, requesting the use of this software to detect 
the author of several bomb threats.28 
However, it was not until April 2011, following a 
request by the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
                                                          
24 Kevin Curran, Peter Breslin, Kevin McLaughlin and Gary Tracey, 
‘Hacking and Eavesdropping’, in Lech J. Janczewski and Andrew M. 
Colarik, eds, Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism (New York: 
Information Science Reference, 2008), 309. 
25 Christopher Woo and Miranda So, ‘The Case for Magic Lantern: 
September 11 Highlights the Need for Increased Surveillance’, 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Volume 15, Number 2, Spring 
2002, 521 – 538, 524. 
26 Christopher Soghoian, ‘Caught In The Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, 
And Government Back Doors In The Web 2.0 Era’, 8 J. On 
Telecomm. & High Tech. L. (2009) 359 – 424, 400 – 401. 
27 Susan Landau, Surveillance or Security – The risks Posed by new 
Wiretapping Technologies, 133. 
28 A scanned copy of the affidavit is available at 
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/timberline_affid
avit.pdf . 
submitted under the Freedom of Information Act,29 
that the FBI disclosed various documents with 
detailed information on the use and operation of the 
legal framework and functioning of CIPAV.30 The 
analysis of such documents allows us to draw two 
preliminary conclusions: first, that this program was 
used abundantly, even by government agencies other 
than the FBI; and, secondly, that initially there were 
various understandings as to the legal requirements 
for its admissibility, which met, on one side, the 
proponents of the absence of any legal requirements 
for its use, and, on the other side, the advocates of 
the necessity for judicial authorization prior to its 
use.31 
Despite the effect that the disclosure of this 
information had, the resort to malware in the context 
of criminal investigations continued. A demonstration 
of this may be found in the publication, on April 2013, 
of a court order32 signed by Judge Stephen Smith, of 
the Houston Division of the Southern District Court of 
Texas, denying judicial authorization for the use of an 
unidentified type of malware in a criminal 
investigation on the grounds that its installation was 
not properly specified and, consequently, that there 
would be uncertainty as to whether the malware in 
question could be installed on computer systems 
other than that of the intended recipient.33 
Even though the decision does not mention the name 
of the malware in question, if it was a newer version 
of CIPAV, it had to be a more advanced version than 
the one referred to in the documents provided by the 
FBI, since it includes the following to the functions 
described above: records of internet activity, including 
firewall logs, caches, browser history, cookies, 
‘bookmarked’ or ‘favourite’ web pages, search terms 
that the user entered into any internet search engine, 
                                                          
29 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended by Public Law No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 
2524, and Public Law No. 111-83, § 564, 123 Stat. 2142, 2184. 
30 Available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/new-fbi-
documents-show-depth-government . 
31 According to the documentation, the solution adopted would be 
the a two-step procedure: the first one would be to require a judicial 
warrant prior to the intrusion in the target computer system; the 
second step would be to request a Pen/Trap order to authorize the 
surveillance, for which see 169 of the documentation provided by the 
FBI, available at https://www.eff.org/files/FBI_CIPAV-08-p169.pdf . 
32 In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 
958 F.Supp.2d 753, the memorandum and order is available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/smithorderdenyingwebcamwarrant.pdf . 
33 Though the court makes a reference to CIPAV in footnote 10 of 
the decision, it is not clear whether the malware in question was a 
newer version of CIPAV or not. 
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records of user-typed web addresses, user names and 
passwords recorded, e-mail contacts, e-mail contents, 
chat and other messaging program logs, photographs 
on the target computer system, among others. 
Furthermore, the malware in question also allows for 
the remote control of the target computer system, 
including the capability of using the subject’s webcam 
to take pictures in order to allow for the identification 
of the user and his or her location. 
The German experience: The Bundestrojaner 
In 2006, as part of a criminal investigation concerning 
facts allegedly related to terrorism, a public 
prosecutor requested that a judicial warrant be 
granted, authorizing a remote search on a suspect’s 
computer through the installation of a Trojan. The 
request was rejected on 25 November 2006, and the 
prosecutor appealed to the German Federal Court of 
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), arguing that the legal 
provisions included in the German 
Strafprozeßordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure), 
pertaining to (physical) search and entries allowed for 
the use of such means of obtaining evidence.34 The 
Federal Court concluded that no such analogy could 
be made and that the use of this measure lacked a 
legal basis, thus rendering it inadmissible in criminal 
procedure.35 
Less than a month after this decision, on 20 December 
2006, the Gesetz über den Verfassungsschutz in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia 
Constitution Protection Act) was altered, and a 
provision was introduced in article § 5.2 (11), which 
provides: 
2. Die Verfassungsschutzbehörde darf, soweit 
nicht der Schutz des Kernbereichs privater 
Lebensgestaltung entgegensteht, zur 
Informationsbeschaffung als 
nachrichtendienstliche Mittel die folgenden 
Maßnahmen anwenden: 
… 
11. Zugriff auf zugangsgesicherte 
Telekommunikationsinhalte und sonstige 
                                                          
34 Giuseppe Vaciago, Digital Forensics, Italian Criminal Procedure 
and Due Process Rights in the Cyber Age (Torino: G. Giappichelli 
Editore, 2012), 125. 
35 Judgment of the Third Criminal Chamber of the Federal Supreme 




Informations- und Kommunikationsinhalte im 
Internet auf dem technisch hierfür für jede 
Nutzerin und jeden Nutzer vorgesehenen 
Weg, ohne selbst Kommunikationsadressatin 
oder -adressat und ohne von den an der 
Kommunikation teilnehmenden Personen 
oder vergleichbaren Berechtigten hierzu 
autorisiert zu sein, unter den 
Voraussetzungen des § 7a; eine Online-
Durchsuchung ist ausgeschlossen; 
2. The Constitution Protection Authority may, 
to the extent that it is not contrary to the 
protection of the core area of private life, 
apply for the following measures for the 
gathering of information and intelligence: 
… 
11. Access to the content of secure 
telecommunications and other information 
and the content of communications on the 
Internet using technical means provided for 
each and every user, without the addressee of 
the communication or the individuals 
participating in the communication being 
aware, under the requirements of § 7; an 
online search is excluded; 
This clause grants the Constitution Protection 
Authority (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) the 
powers to use measures to acquire information 
through secret monitoring and other reconnaissance 
of the internet, including covert participation in chats 
and even – though this solution is less clear – access 
to web mail or to web sites with restricted access by 
using the credentials collected from various sources, 
such as informants.36 Finally, the law in question also 
allowed for secret access to computer systems 
through the use of techniques that made the 
discovery and exploitation of technical vulnerabilities 
for the installation of malware possible.37 The 
                                                          
36 Wiebke Abel and Burkhard Schafer, ‘The German Constitutional 
Court on the Right in Confidentiality and Integrity of Information 
Technology Systems – a case report on BVerfG, NJW 2008, 822’, 
SCRIPTed – A Journal of Law, Technology & Society, 1, Vol. 6 
(2009), 106 – 123, 107 – 110. 
37 The court stated that ‘[s]uch measures were already executed in 
isolated cases by federal authorities without a specific statutory 
empowerment. Little is known of the nature of the practical execution 
of previous “online searches” or of their successes’, Judgment of the 
First Senate of 27 February 2008 on the basis of the oral hearing of 
10 October 2007, 1 BvR 370, 595/07. The official English translation 
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malware in question would then allow that authority 
to spy, monitor and analyse content, as well as to 
control the computer systems affected – although the 
applicability of this measure was limited to the 
functions of the Constitution Protection Authority, as 
provided for in § 3 of the North Rhine-Westphalia 
Constitution Protection Act: 
(1) Aufgabe der Verfassungsschutzbehörde ist 
die Sammlung und Auswertung von 
Informationen, insbesondere von sach- und 
personenbezogenen Auskünften, Nachrichten 
und Unterlagen über 
1. Bestrebungen, die gegen die freiheitliche 
demokratische Grundordnung, den Bestand 
oder die Sicherheit des Bundes oder eines 
Landes gerichtet sind oder eine ungesetzliche 
Beeinträchtigung der Amtsführung der 
Verfassungsorgane des Bundes oder eines 
Landes oder ihrer Mitglieder zum Ziel haben, 
2. sicherheitsgefährdende oder 
geheimdienstliche Tätigkeiten für eine fremde 
Macht, 
3. Bestrebungen, die durch Anwendung von 
Gewalt oder darauf gerichtete 
Vorbereitungshandlungen auswärtige Belange 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gefährden, 
4. Bestrebungen und Tätigkeiten, die gegen 
den Gedanken der Völkerverständigung 
(Artikel 9 Abs. 2 des Grundgesetzes) oder das 
friedliche Zusammenleben der Völker (Artikel 
26 des Grundgesetzes) gerichtet sind, im 
Geltungsbereich des Grundgesetzes, soweit 
tatsächliche Anhaltspunkte für den Verdacht 
solcher Bestrebungen und Tätigkeiten 
vorliegen. 
[…] 
(1) Collection and evaluation of information, 
in particular of factual and personal 
information, messages and documents on 
                                                                                                  
 . A manifestation of the German interest in the use of this type of 
malware can also be found in the documents provided by the FBI 
about CIPAV, in which there is an e-mail sent from an Assistant 
Legal Attaché stationed in Frankfurt, Germany, with the following 
content: ‘I am embarrassed to be approaching you again with a 
request from the Germans (after your previous help and offers of 
assistance have not yet been followed up on by our German 
colleagues), but they now have asked us about CIPAV (Computer 
and Internet Protocol Address Verifier) software, allegedly used by 
the Bu [bureau]?’, available at https://www.eff.org/files/FBI_CIPAV-
08-p9.pdf . 
1. activities targeting the free democratic 
fundamental order, the continued existence 
or the security of the Federation or of 
a Land or an unlawful impairment of the 
exercise of office by the constitutional bodies 
of the Federation or of a Land or of their 
members. 
2. activities for a foreign power which 
endanger security, or for a foreign security 
service, 
3. activities which endanger foreign interests 
of the Federal Republic of Germany by means 
of the use of force or preparatory acts aimed 
thereto, 
4. efforts and activities targeting the ideal of 
international understanding (Article 9.2 of the 
Constitutional Law) or peaceful relations 
between nations (Article 26 of the 
Constitutional Law), within the area of 
application of the Constitutional Law, insofar 
as there exist factual indications of the 
suspicion of such efforts and activities.38 
…39 
An appeal was submitted before the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. On 27 February 2008, the court 
reached a decision.40 It first considered the issue in 
light of three fundamental rights: (i) the right to 
secrecy of correspondence, post and 
telecommunication, (ii) the right to the inviolability of 
the home, and (iii) the right to informational self-
determination. However, the method by which the 
evidence was obtained was at issue. It was argued 
that the constitutional protection was not limited to 
the object of each of these fundamental rights. Thus, 
in view of the need to offer, in a more comprehensive 
way, constitutional protection in relation to the 
integrity of computer systems, as well as to the data 
                                                          
38 English translation available at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20080227_
1bvr037007en.html 
39 Though the purpose of the law was to allow for the use of malware 
as a tool to deal with terrorism, it was not sufficiently clear in stating 
it and the German Constitutional Court, found that ‘the area of 
application of the revision is not restricted to the fight against 
terrorism, either explicitly or as a consequence of the systematic 
context. The provision requires a justification for its entire area of 
application’.  
40 Judgment of the First Senate of 27 February 2008 on the basis of 
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stored and transmitted through it, the court 
established the fundamental right to the guarantee of 
the confidentiality and integrity of information 
technology systems41 (Grundrecht aug 
Gewährleistung der Vertraulichkeit und Integrität 
informationstechnischer Systeme). The fundamental 
right is based on human dignity and especially on the 
general right of personality, and is formulated, at 
[204]: 
… Grundrecht aug Gewährleistung der 
Vertraulichkeit und Integrität 
informationstechnischer Systeme ist zunächst 
das Interesse des Nutzers, dass die von einem 
vom Schutzbereich erfassten 
informationstechnischen System erzeugten, 
verarbeiteten und gespeicherten Daten 
vertraulich bleiben. 
… the basic right to the confidentiality and 
integrity of information technology systems is 
first the interest of the user in ensuring that 
the data which are created, processed and 
stored by the information technology system 
that is covered by its scope of protection 
remain confidential. 
The court balanced its conclusion with the following 
statement, at [206]: 
Der grundrechtliche Schutz der 
Vertraulichkeits- und Integritätserwartung 
besteht unabhängig davon, ob der Zugriff auf 
das informationstechnische System leicht 
oder nur mit erheblichem Aufwand möglich 
ist. Eine grundrechtlich anzuerkennende 
Vertraulichkeits- und Integritätserwartung 
besteht allerdings nur, soweit der Betroffene 
das informationstechnische System als 
eigenes nutzt und deshalb den Umständen 
nach davon ausgehen darf, dass er allein oder 
zusammen mit anderen zur Nutzung 
berechtigten Personen über das 
informationstechnische System 
selbstbestimmt verfügt. Soweit die Nutzung 
                                                          
41 It should, however, be noted that in 2006 González-Cuellar 
Serrano had already introduced, in similar terms, the idea of the 
existence of a right not to have intrusions in one’s digital 
environment (derecho a la no intromisión en el entorno digital), 
deriving from the right to information technology freedom (derecho a 
la libertad informática) –’Garantías constitucionales de la 
persecución penal en el entorno digital’, in AA.VV. Derecho Y 
Justicia Penal en el Siglo XXI – Liber Amicorum en Homenaje al 
Profesor Antonio González-Cuellar Garcia (Madrid: Editorial Colex, 
2006), 887 – 916, 916. 
des eigenen informationstechnischen Systems 
über informationstechnische Systeme 
stattfindet, die sich in der Verfügungsgewalt 
anderer befinden, erstreckt sich der Schutz 
des Nutzers auch hierauf. 
An expectation of confidentiality and integrity 
to be recognized from the fundamental rights 
perspective however only exists insofar as the 
person concerned uses the information 
technology system as his or her own, and 
hence may presume according to the 
circumstances that he or she alone or 
together with others entitled to use it 
disposes of the information technology 
system in a self-determined manner. Insofar 
as the use of the personal information 
technology system takes place via information 
technology systems which are at the disposal 
of others, the protection of the user also 
covers this. 
After subjecting the provision under analysis to 
constitutional scrutiny, particularly to the newly 
named fundamental right, the court concluded that it 
violated the principles of clarity, legal certainty and 
proportionality, and that it was therefore 
unconstitutional. However, the court suggested a 
future legal formulation of the use of such means of 
obtaining evidence in accordance with constitutional 
requirements.42 
The admissibility of the use of malware in cases of 
international terrorism was introduced into German 
law via the Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des 
internationalen Terrorismus durch das 
Bundeskriminalamt (Law on the Defence against the 
Dangers of International Terrorism through the 
Federal Criminal Police) of 25 December 2008.43 This 
took into consideration the comments provided by 
the Federal Constitutional Court, although not for the 
purpose of criminal prosecution, but merely for the 
purposes of prevention.44 
                                                          
42 For a detailed analysis of the court’s decision, see Juan Carlos 
Ortiz Pradillo, Problemas Procesales de la Ciberdelincuencia 
(Madrid: Editorial Colex, 2013), 181 – 185. 
43 Pradillo, ‘Remote Forensic Software as a Tool for Investigating 
Cases of Terrorism’,5. 
44 Klaus Rogall, ‘A nova regulamentação da vigilância das 
telecomunicações na Alemanha’, in Maria Fernanda Palma and 
others, AA.VV., 2.º Congresso de Investigação Criminal, Coord., 
(Coimbra: Almedina, 2009) 177 – 220, 120 – 121. 
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On 8 October 2011, a hacker group named Chaos 
Computer Club released information reporting on the 
use of a type of malware by the German police – 
commonly classified as a Trojan but apparently a 
blended threat45 – which was to become known as the 
Bundestrojaner or Staatstrojaner. 
This type of malware is sent to the suspect’s computer 
system in the form of an apparently harmless 
software update. After the user installs it, the 
authority behind it is able to record VoIP calls 
(including Skype), monitor all of the suspect’s activity 
online, record passwords, enter data into the target 
computer system and even activate the hardware, 
thus allowing the remote use of the microphone and 
the webcam to take pictures and record sounds that 
are subsequently sent to the investigating 
authorities.46 
Therefore, despite the observations established by 
the Federal Constitutional Court for the use of 
malware, and regardless the exceptional nature in 
which it is legally based, there were in reports 2011 of 
the Bundestrojaner being used over fifty times, not 
limited to the cases to which it is legally destined.47 
The Spanish legal framework and the Gallardón 
Draft Bill  
No specific legislation exists in Spain at present on the 
use of malware as a means of obtaining evidence in 
criminal proceedings. This does not warrant the 
conclusion that it is currently inadmissible,48 nor that 
                                                          
45 A blended threat is the name given to a type of malware that 
combines certain characteristics of different types of malware. An 
example of a blended threat can be found in spy-phishing, a tool 
used to perform phishing attacks that combines different types of 
malware, such as Trojans or spyware, that allow for the collection of 
confidential information: Gregor Urbas and Kim-Kwang Raymond 
Choo, Resource Materials on Technology-Enabled Crime, Technical 
and Background Paper 28 (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2008), 5. 
46 For a detailed analysis on the origin and functioning of the 
Bundestrojaner and of the use of this type of malware by the Swiss 
and Austrian authorities, see Rolph H. Weber and Ulrike I. Heinrich, 
Anonymization (London: Springer, 2012), 60 – 65. 
47 Marcel Rosenbach, Holger Stark and Steffen Winter, ‘Trojan 
Trouble: The shady past of Germany’s Spyware’, Spiegel Online 
International, 17 October 2011, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/trojan-trouble-the-
shady-past-of-germany-s-spyware-a-792276.html . 
48 Velasco Nuñez, for example, though recognizing the difficulties 
raised by the lack of legal provision on this subject, is of the opinion 
that these means may be legally admissible through the application, 
by analogy, of the electronic and magnetic communication 
interception provisions, in accordance with the conditions imposed 
by the jurisprudence of the Spanish Supreme and Constitutional 
Courts on interferences on the right of privacy on 
telecommunications, for which see Eloy Velasco Núñez, Delitos 
cometidos a través de Internet. Cuestiones procesales (Madrid: La 
it will not be created by means of a judicial extension 
of existing procedural provisions. Illustrating this point 
with an example, Ortiz Pradillo demonstrates the 
establishment, through three judgments of the 
Spanish Supreme Court,49 of the use of electronic 
devices called IMSI catchers or Cell Site Simulators. 
These are designed to determine, from the physical 
location of certain mobile telephones and their 
proximity to the antennas that provide them with a 
connection to the telephone network, their 
approximate physical location, their IMSI number 
(International Mobile Subscriber Identity), and the 
mobile telephone number associated with it. 
The Spanish Supreme Court considered that the 
evidence obtained from such devices was admissible 
in relation to the legal framework governing the 
collection and processing of personal data by security 
forces and corps for the purposes of law 
enforcement.50 However, as noted by Ortiz Pradillo, 
the law does not provide for a warrant for the 
collection and processing of this data. Taking into 
account the provisions of article 22 of the Organic Law 
15/1999, judicially applied to the collection of these 
data – qualified by the court as personal data –, and 
the legal framework governing the transfer of the 
same data to telephone operators,51 which provides 
for the necessity of the precedence of warrant, one 
can draw the rather illogical conclusion that judicial 
authorization will not be required when the police 
may, on its own impulse, obtain them, but it will be 
legally mandatory when the same entity requires 
cooperation from telephone operators.52 
Highlighting the unjustified disparity of the criteria in 
this matter, Ortiz Pradillo warns that the 
                                                                                                  
Ley, 2010), 136 – 137; and ‘ADSL y Troyanos: Intervención de sus 
datos y telecomunicaciones en la investigación penal’, La Ley Penal, 
82 (2011), 18 – 25, 24. 
49 The first dated 20 May 2008 (RJ 2008/4387), the second dated 18 
November 2008 (RJ 2009/2089) and the third dated 28 January 
2009 (RJ 2009/3299). 
50 Article 22 of the Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre, de 
Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal (Organic Law 15/1999, of 
13 December, on protection of personal data). 
51 Ley 25/2007, de 18 de octubre, de conservación de datos relativos 
a las comunicaciones electrónicas y a las redes públicas de 
comunicaciones (Law 25/2007 of 18 October, on the retention of 
data relating to electronic communications and public 
communication networks). 
52 Juan Carlos Ortiz Pradillo ‘“Hacking” legal al servicio de la 
investigación criminal: nuevos instrumentos para la investigación y 
prueba de la delinquencia informática’, in Redacción Editorial 
Aranzadi, Delincuencia Informática. Tiempos de Cautela y Amparo 
(Navarra: Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2012) 187 – 191; Pradillo, 
Problemas Procesales de la Ciberdelincuencia, 188 – 191. 
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jurisprudential understanding, according to which the 
collection of data ‘in the context of a criminal 
investigation – never of an exclusive exploratory 
nature – for the discovery of a particularly serious 
crime may be considered proportionate, necessary 
and, as such, free of any violation of fundamental 
rights and freedoms’, may likewise pave the way for 
attempts to obtain personal data from open Wi-Fi 
networks, resorting to ‘spyware’. 
Objecting to this tendency of case law to place itself in 
the legislator’s stead, and expressing his opposition to 
an interpretation that seeks to legitimize the use of 
malware as a means of obtaining evidence without 
any express provision to that effect, Ortiz Pradillo 
acknowledges that it is possible that Spanish 
jurisprudence could interpret certain rules so as to 
substantiate the admissibility of the use of malware in 
violation ‘of the minimum requirements of legality 
and clarity established by the ECHR’.53 
If this were to happen in the absence of the reform of 
the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure, certain 
requirements for the use of malware should be 
judicially set out which include (i) the requirement of 
precedence of judicial authorization; (ii) the 
imposition of the secret nature of the use of the 
measure; (iii) the establishment of the compulsory 
cooperation of third parties, including telecom 
operators when necessary; (iv) the duty of stating the 
legal basis for the court ruling; (v) the exceptional 
nature of the measure and its respective application 
only to particularly serious crimes; and (vi) the 
collection in a fashion such that the authenticity and 
integrity of the information obtained are ensured. 
The path followed in the Spanish legal system seems 
to have been different. There is presently a discussion 
towards a reform at the Spanish procedural level, 
which will predictably lead to the adoption of a new 
Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure, effected through 
what is called by some as the Gallardón54 Draft Bill. 
The legal arrangement provided for in new Title XI, set 
out under the heading ‘remote recordings of 
computer systems’ (‘registros remotos sobre equipos 
informáticos’) seems to comply, in general, with the 
requirements proposed by Ortiz Pradillo, providing for 
                                                          
53 Pradillo, ‘“Hacking” legal al servicio de la investigación criminal: 
nuevos instrumentos para la investigación y prueba de la 
delinquencia informática’, 198. 
54 The name Gallardón was informally attributed after Spain’s 
Minister of Justice Alberto Ruiz Gallardón. 
a – in our view essential – duty to state the legal basis 
for the suitability, necessity and proportionality of the 
measure. Article 350 of the Draft Bill provides as 
follows: 
1.- El Tribunal de Garantías podrá autorizar, a 
petición razonada del Ministerio Fiscal, la 
utilización de datos de identificación y 
códigos, así como la instalación de un 
software, que permitan, de forma remota y 
telemática, el examen a distancia y sin 
conocimiento de su titular o usuario del 
contenido de un ordenador, dispositivo 
electrónico, sistema informático, instrumento 
de almacenamiento masivo de datos 
informáticos o base de datos, siempre que la 
medida resulte proporcionada para la 
investigación de un delito de especial 
gravedad y sea además idónea y necesaria 
para el esclarecimiento del hecho investigado, 
la averiguación de su autor o la localización de 
su paradero. 
2.- La resolución judicial que autorice el 
registro, además de motivar la idoneidad, 
necesidad y proporcionalidad, deberá 
especificar: 
a) Los ordenadores, dispositivos electrónicos, 
sistemas informáticos o parte de los mismos, 
medios de almacenamiento de datos 
informáticos o bases de datos y datos 
informáticos almacenados objeto de la 
medida. 
b) El alcance de la misma, la forma en la que 
se procederá al acceso y aprehensión de los 
datos o archivos informáticos relevantes para 
la causa y el software mediante el que se 
ejecutará el control de la información. 
d) Los agentes autorizados para la ejecución 
de la medida. 
e) La autorización, en su caso, para la 
realización y conservación de copias de los 
datos informáticos. 
f) Las medidas precisas para la preservación 
de la integridad de los datos almacenados, así 
como para la inaccesibilidad o supresión de 
dichos datos del sistema informático al que se 
ha tenido acceso. 
… 
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1. The Court of Guarantees may authorize, 
upon a reasoned request by the public 
prosecutor, the use of identification data and 
codes, as well as the installation of a software, 
which allow, in a remote and telematic 
manner, the examination at a distance and 
unbeknownst to its owner or to the user, the 
contents of a computer, electronic device, 
computer system, mass storage instrument or 
database, whenever the measure is 
proportionate to the investigation of an 
offence of a particularly serious nature, and is 
moreover suitable and necessary for clarifying 
the fact under investigation, the investigation 
of its perpetrator or the location of his 
whereabouts. 
2. The legal decision that authorizes the 
recording, besides having to justify the 
suitability, necessity and proportionality, shall 
specify: 
a) The computers, electronic devices, 
computer systems or part thereof, means of 
storing computer data or databases and data 
which are subject to the measure. 
b) the scope of the measure, the way in which 
the access to and seizure of the data or 
computer files that are relevant for the cause 
will be performed, and the software by means 
of which the information control will be 
executed. 
d) The agents authorized for the execution of 
the measure. 
e) The authorization, if applicable, for 
conducting and retaining copies of the 
computer data. 
f) The measures necessary to preserve the 
integrity of the stored data, as well as for the 
inaccessibility or deletion thereof from the 
computer system which it accessed. 
Article 351 further provides for the duty to cooperate, 
including internet service providers and those 
responsible for the computer system or database 
subject to the measure. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the legislative 
technique could lead to an excessive margin of 
latitude for the investigating judge, and that the 
concept of ‘offence of a particularly serious nature’ is 
not duly specified,55 in the event that the proposal in 
question is approved, the Spanish legal system will 
gain in terms of clarity and certainty when applying 
such measures. 
The propensity for the establishment of 
malware as a means of obtaining 
evidence in a digital environment  
The HIPCAR Project56 and the Directive 2011/92/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, 
and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA57 are discussed in this section. 
With the refinement of the techniques used for the 
practice of cybercrime on a global scale, interest has 
been increasing in establishing uniform instruments at 
the international level to deal this new form of 
criminality. Indeed, considering that the state in which 
the target subject operates cannot be the state in 
which the typical result is produced, and since the 
application of these instruments is still (or at least 
should be) limited by the principle of territoriality of 
the application of criminal procedural law, it is of the 
utmost interest that the instruments which are 
deemed more effective are established in the largest 
possible number of states. 
Thus, particularly since the Convention on 
Cybercrime, a number of supranational initiatives 
have developed, aiming to promote the adoption of 
the use of malware as a means of obtaining evidence 
in a digital environment. Hence, in December 2008, 
the European Commission and the International 
Telecommunication Union initiated the 
Harmonization of ICT Policies Legislation and 
Regulatory Procedures in the Caribbean (HIPCAR) for 
the purpose of promoting uniformity of legislation in 
the countries of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM58) in nine areas59 in relation to information 
                                                          
55 For a review of this Draft Bill, see Pradillo, Problemas Procesales 
de la Ciberdelincuencia, 193 – 196. 
56 http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Projects/ITU-EC-
ACP/HIPCAR/Pages/default.aspx . 
57 OJ L 335, 17.12.2011, p. 1–14. 
58 The members of CARICOM are Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
59 Namely, electronic commerce (transactions), electronic commerce 
(evidence), privacy and data protection, interception of 
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technology. The result was possibly the most detailed 
legislative model of cybercrime and digital evidence in 
existence, which may serve as a guide for the various 
states that wish to implement it.60 
Thus, in article 27 of Cybercrime/e-Crimes: Model 
Policy Guidelines & Legislative Texts,61 a rule was 
created which provides for the use of malware for the 
purposes of criminal investigation (remote forensic 
software), which reads: 
Sec. 27 – Forensic Software 
(1) If a judge is satisfied on the basis of 
[information on oath/affidavit] that in an 
investigation concerning an offence listed in 
paragraph 5 herein below there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that essential evidence can not 
be collected by applying other instruments listed in 
Part IV but is reasonably required for the purposes 
of a criminal investigation, the [judge/magistrate] 
[may/shall] on application authorize a police 
officer to utilize a remote forensic software with 
the specific task required for the investigation and 
install it on the suspect’s computer system in order 
to collect the relevant evidence. The application 
needs to contain the following information: 
(a) suspect of the offence, if possible with 
name and address, and 
(b) description of the targeted computer 
system, and 
(c) description of the intended measure, 
extent and duration of the utilization, and 
(d) reasons for the necessity of the utilization. 
(2) Within such investigation it is necessary to 
ensure that modifications to the computer system 
of the suspect are limited to those essential for the 
investigation and that any changes if possible can 
be undone after the end of the investigation. 
During the investigation it is necessary to log  
(a) the technical mean used and time and date 
of the application; and 
                                                                                                  
communications, cybercrime, access to public information (freedom 
of information), universal service and access, interconnection and 
access and, finally, licensing. 
60 Marco Gercke, Understanding Cybercrime: Phenomena, 
Challenges and Legal Response (Geneva: ITU, 2012), 143. 
61 (ITU, 2012), available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Projects/ITU-
EC-ACP/HIPCAR/Pages/default.aspx . 
(b) the identification of the computer system 
and details of the modifications undertaken 
within the investigation; 
(c) any information obtained. 
Information obtained by the use of such software 
need to be protected against any modification, 
unauthorized deletion and unauthorized access. 
(3) The duration of authorization in section 27 (1) is 
limited to [3 month]. If the conditions of the 
authorization are no longer met, the action taken 
is to stop immediately. 
(4) The authorization to install the software 
includes remotely accessing the suspects computer 
system. 
(5) If the installation process requires physical 
access to a place the requirements of section 20 
need to be fulfilled. 
(6) If necessary a police officer may pursuant to the 
order of court granted in (1) above request that 
the court order an internet service provider to 
support the installation process. 
(7) [List of offences] 
(8) A country may decide not to implement section 
27. 
Fully aware of the highly intrusive nature of this 
medium, the proposal introduces certain restrictions 
for its application, such as the requirement that the 
evidence cannot be obtained otherwise, the need for 
the authorization by a judge or magistrate, the 
obligation to state reasons leading to the 
authorization, and the limitation of its scope of 
application. 
This provision is a good example of legislative 
technique that could be used by states wishing to 
integrate this means of obtaining evidence in their 
procedure.  
On the other hand, the EU has also – albeit with little 
emphasis – sought to foster the establishment of this 
means of obtaining evidence. As early as 2008, on the 
occasion of the adoption of the strategy to strengthen 
the provisions dealing with cybercrime, the Council of 
Ministers of the European Union announced that its 
strategy for the next five years would include, among 
others, cyber-patrols for the purpose of tracking of 
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criminals online and remote searches.62 However, 
with greater expressiveness, it was noted in recital 27 
of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, on combating the sexual abuse 
and sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2004/68/JHA, that: 
Effective investigatory tools should be made 
available to those responsible for the 
investigation and prosecutions of the offences 
referred to in this Directive. Those tools could 
include interception of communications, 
covert surveillance including electronic 
surveillance, monitoring of bank accounts or 
other financial investigations, taking into 
account, inter alia, the principle of 
proportionality and the nature and 
seriousness of the offences under 
investigation. Where appropriate, and in 
accordance with national law, such tools 
should also include the possibility for law 
enforcement authorities to use a concealed 
identity on the Internet. 
In view of the popularity that this means of obtaining 
evidence has been increasingly garnering, and given 
its obvious advantages, it is possible that in the future, 
Member States might establish it by law, not only in 
regard to dealing sexual abuse and sexual exploitation 
of children and child pornography, but also regarding 
other kinds of serious crime, such as terrorism. 
The use of malware and the Cybercrime 
Law  
Direct (in)applicability of the legal framework 
for the interception of communications and 
search and seizure of digital data 
It is argued, mainly by members of the police – always 
surrounded by secrecy and never put into writing –, 
that the admissibility of online searches is based on a 
direct application of the legal framework for the 
interception of communications, provided for in 
article 18 of the Cybercrime Law: 
Artigo 18.º Intercepção de comunicações 
1 - É admissível o recurso à intercepção de 
comunicações em processos relativos a 
                                                          




a) Previstos na presente lei; ou 
b) Cometidos por meio de um sistema 
informático ou em relação aos quais 
seja necessário proceder à recolha de 
prova em suporte electrónico, quando 
tais crimes se encontrem previstos no 
artigo 187.º do Código de Processo 
Penal. 
2 - A intercepção e o registo de transmissões 
de dados informáticos só podem ser 
autorizados durante o inquérito, se houver 
razões para crer que a diligência é 
indispensável para a descoberta da verdade 
ou que a prova seria, de outra forma, 
impossível ou muito difícil de obter, por 
despacho fundamentado do juiz de instrução 
e mediante requerimento do Ministério 
Público. 
3 - A intercepção pode destinar-se ao registo 
de dados relativos ao conteúdo das 
comunicações ou visar apenas a recolha e 
registo de dados de tráfego, devendo o 
despacho referido no número anterior 
especificar o respectivo âmbito, de acordo 
com as necessidades concretas da 
investigação. 
4 - Em tudo o que não for contrariado pelo 
presente artigo, à intercepção e registo de 
transmissões de dados informáticos é 
aplicável o regime da intercepção e gravação 
de conversações ou comunicações telefónicas 
constante dos artigos 187.º, 188.º e 190.º do 
Código de Processo Penal. 
Article 18 Interception of communications 
1 – The interception of communications shall 
be permitted in proceedings on criminal 
offences: 
a) Provided for herein; or 
b) Committed by means of a computer 
system or which require the collection 
of electronic evidence, where such 
criminal offences are provided for in 
article 187 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code. 
2 - Interception and record of transmission of 
computer data shall only be authorized during 
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the investigation stage, where there are 
reasons to believe that this measure is 
essential to the uncovering of the truth or 
that, otherwise, it would be impossible or very 
difficult to obtain evidence, on the basis of a 
substantiated order from the examining 
judge, further to a request from the Public 
Prosecution. 
3 - The interception may concern the record 
of data on the content of communications or 
aim only at the collection and record of traffic 
data, and the order referred to in the 
preceding paragraph shall specify the 
respective scope, according to the specific 
needs of the investigation. 
4 - With regard to all matters which are not 
contrary to this article, the regime of 
interception and recording of telephone 
conversations or communications laid down in 
articles 187, 188 and 190 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code shall apply to the interception 
and record of transmissions of computer 
data.63 
In addition, the argument is sometimes mixed with 
the legal framework provided for in article 15 of the 
Cybercrime Law, which provides: 
Artigo 15.º Pesquisa de dados informáticos 
1 - Quando no decurso do processo se tornar 
necessário à produção de prova, tendo em 
vista a descoberta da verdade, obter dados 
informáticos específicos e determinados, 
armazenados num determinado sistema 
informático, a autoridade judiciária 
competente autoriza ou ordena por despacho 
que se proceda a uma pesquisa nesse sistema 
informático, devendo, sempre que possível, 
presidir à diligência. 
2 - O despacho previsto no número anterior 
tem um prazo de validade máximo de 30 dias, 
sob pena de nulidade. 
3 - O órgão de polícia criminal pode proceder 
à pesquisa, sem prévia autorização da 
autoridade judiciária, quando: 
a) A mesma for voluntariamente 
consentida por quem tiver a 
disponibilidade ou controlo desses 
                                                          
63 Translation from http://www.anacom.pt/ . 
dados, desde que o consentimento 
prestado fique, por qualquer forma, 
documentado; 
b) Nos casos de terrorismo, 
criminalidade violenta ou altamente 
organizada, quando haja fundados 
indícios da prática iminente de crime 
que ponha em grave risco a vida ou a 
integridade de qualquer pessoa. 
4 - Quando o órgão de polícia criminal 
proceder à pesquisa nos termos do número 
anterior: 
a) No caso previsto na alínea b), a 
realização da diligência é, sob pena de 
nulidade, imediatamente comunicada 
à autoridade judiciária competente e 
por esta apreciada em ordem à sua 
validação; 
b) Em qualquer caso, é elaborado e 
remetido à autoridade judiciária 
competente o relatório previsto no 
artigo 253.º do Código de Processo 
Penal. 
5 - Quando, no decurso de pesquisa, surgirem 
razões para crer que os dados procurados se 
encontram noutro sistema informático, ou 
numa parte diferente do sistema pesquisado, 
mas que tais dados são legitimamente 
acessíveis a partir do sistema inicial, a 
pesquisa pode ser estendida mediante 
autorização ou ordem da autoridade 
competente, nos termos dos n.os 1 e 2. 
6 - À pesquisa a que se refere este artigo são 
aplicáveis, com as necessárias adaptações, as 
regras de execução das buscas previstas no 
Código de Processo Penal e no Estatuto do 
Jornalista. 
Article 15 
Search of computer data 
1 - Where, in the course of proceedings, the 
collection of evidence, necessary to uncover 
the truth, requires that specified computer 
data, stored in a specific computer system, are 
obtained, the competent judicial authority 
shall authorize or order the search to that 
computer system, overseeing such 
investigations whenever possible. 
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2 - The order provided for in the preceding 
paragraph shall be valid for a maximum period 
of 30 days, on pain of being deemed null and 
void. 
3 - Criminal police bodies shall undertake the 
search, without a prior authorization from the 
judicial authority: 
a) Where whoever holds or controls 
data under consideration voluntarily 
consents to the search, insofar as the 
consent is documented in any way; 
b) In cases of terrorism, violent or 
highly-organized crimes, or where 
there is evidence to substantiate the 
imminent commission of a criminal 
offence threatening the life or 
integrity of any person. 
4 - Where criminal police bodies undertake 
the search pursuant to the preceding 
paragraph: 
a) In the situation provided for in 
point b), the investigation shall be 
promptly communicated to the 
competent judicial authority, and 
assessed by the latter as far as the 
validation of the measure is 
concerned, on pain of being deemed 
null and void; 
b) In any other situation, the report 
provided for in article 253 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code shall be 
drawn up and submitted to the 
competent judicial authority. 
5 - Where, in the course of the search, there 
are grounds to believe that the data sought is 
stored in another computer system or part of 
it, and such data is lawfully accessible from 
the initial system, the search may be extended 
to the other system, by means of an 
authorization or order from the competent 
authority, pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2. 
6 – To the search referred to herein shall 
apply, duly adapted, the rules on execution of 
searches provided for in the Criminal 
Procedure Code and in the Journalists 
Statute.64 
                                                          
64 Translation from http://www.anacom.pt/ . 
However, none of the precepts noted above is 
sufficient to provide a legal basis for the installation 
and use of malware in computer systems used by 
those suspected of committing criminal offences, nor 
is it possible to combine these provisions in order to 
construct a legal basis for it. 
First, with regard to the interception of 
communications, neither the provisions of article 18 
of the Cybercrime Law, nor the legal framework for 
interception under paragraph 4, provide any legal 
basis to support the remote installation of malware 
with a view to obtaining information. On the contrary, 
the rules concerned permit the interception of 
communications, that is, obtaining the 
communications between the time that they are sent 
by the sender and the moment they arrive with the 
recipient, but never the monitoring of a device that 
may even not be used to send any communication 
(e.g., if the suspect is typing a password to decrypt 
files stored in his computer).65 
Some could argue, however, that article 189 of the 
Portuguese Criminal Procedure Code, providing for 
the extension of the rules governing the interception 
of telephone conversations and communications to 
environmental intercepts, could provide the legal 
basis for the installation and use of malware in 
specific computer systems. Given that paragraph 4 of 
article 18 of the Cybercrime Law allows for the 
application of the rules governing the interception of 
telephone conversations and communications that 
are included in the Portuguese Criminal Procedure 
Code, and given that article 189, governing 
environmental intercepts, provides for an extension of 
those rules, it could be argued that the similarity 
between environmental intercepts and the use of 
malware could provide the legal basis for the use of 
the latter. However, notwithstanding the existence of 
                                                          
65 In this regard, the German Constitutional Court stated in its 
judgment of 27 February 2008, that ‘If a complex information 
technology system is technically infiltrated in order to perform 
telecommunication surveillance (“source telecommunication 
surveillance”), the infiltration overcomes the critical hurdle to spying 
on the system as a whole. The endangerment thereby brought about 
goes far beyond what is entailed by the mere surveillance of ongoing 
telecommunication. In particular, the data stored on personal 
computers which does not relate to the use of the system for 
telecommunication can also be obtained. For instance, the conduct 
in using a personal computer for personal purposes, the frequency 
of accessing certain services, in particular also the contents of files 
created or – insofar as the infiltrated information technology system 
also controls appliances in households – the conduct in the personal 
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more substantive arguments regarding this matter, to 
be presented in a future paper, the fact is that, not 
only are we not necessarily before an interception 
(the suspect may be monitored even if no 
communication is being sent by him or her), but also 
the reference made by the legislator in paragraph 4 of 
article 18 of the Cybercrime Law to the legal 
framework for telephone interception is restricted to 
the ‘legal framework for the interception and 
recording of conversations or telephone calls referred 
to in articles 187, 188 and 190 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code’, and not to the legal extension of the 
rules governing the interception of telephone 
conversations and communications to environmental 
intercepts provided for in article 189 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, which was excluded by the legislator. 
Given that the collection of evidence by this means is 
made in two stages – that of the installation of 
malware and that of its use –, the highly invasive 
method used to obtain the information directly from 
its source cannot be ignored. Neither can it be argued 
that the use of malware only allows (or intends) the 
obtaining of information that is available through 
interception. Moreover, no legal basis can be found in 
the provisions for the installation of keyloggers that 
are aimed to obtain, for example, passwords to 
encrypted documents in the target computer and not 
to intercept communications. 
In fact, the use of malware is not only – not even 
mainly – to intercept communications. The 
observation of Manuel da Costa Andrade regarding 
what he considered to be an online search is relevant: 
‘… being in itself an act of telecommunication 
and assuming that the target computer is 
connected to the internet, it does not focus or 
fall on an act of telecommunication. It is, in 
short, an act of telecommunication whose 
object is not telecommunication. An attack 
through telecommunication is not necessarily 
an attack on freedom of telecommunication … 
because the online search does not constitute 
an invasion or perversion of an act of 
telecommunication, it is not covered or 
legitimized by the rules of procedural law 
concerning interference with 
telecommunications.’66 
If there are no legal grounds for the methods by which 
evidence is obtained, it is not possible to create a new 
                                                          
66 Costa Andrade, 168. 
rule in which to fit an unusual method of obtaining 
proof – especially a secret method of obtaining 
evidence –, ignoring the legal and constitutional limits 
to its use. In this respect, Paulo de Sousa Mendes 
observes that ‘the catalogue of the typical methods of 
obtaining evidence includes the respective legal 
frameworks and does not allow their rules to be 
flouted, in order that related but atypical methods of 
obtaining evidence are created. [...] So, the only 
existing freedom with respect to the choice of the 
method of obtaining proof of a fact is the possibility of 
selecting from the catalogue of typical methods of 
proof those that are regarded as suitable for the 
process that is taking place’.67 
Furthermore, as previously noted, some 
commentators have addressed this matter, and 
suggested that, with the establishment of article 15 of 
the Cybercrime Law, particularly paragraph 5, the 
legislator intended to introduce online searches in the 
Portuguese legal system. For instance, Paulo Pinto de 
Albuquerque argues that: 
‘[the] online search has now been established 
in the new Article 15 of Law 109/2009, of 
15.9, which provides for the “search in 
computer system” by order of the judicial 
authority or even a decision by the criminal 
police. The law does not place any restrictions 
relative to the contents of the data that can 
be searched, contrary to what is the case with 
the seizure of computer data. The new law 
also does not require that a computer search 
that is ordered by the Public Prosecutor or the 
criminal police has to be validated by the 
judge. This intrusion into the privacy of the 
person concerned is manifestly 
disproportionate, in view of article 26, 
paragraph 1 and 2, and 32, paragraph 4, of the 
Portuguese Constitution, which reserves to 
the judge the investigative measures that 
represent an intrusion on privacy.’68 
Notwithstanding the inevitable conclusion of 
unconstitutionality reached by Paulo Pinto de 
Albuquerque in view of the assumptions presented, 
these assumptions do not appear to be verified in this 
                                                          
67 Paulo de Sousa Mendes, Lições de Direito Processual Penal 
(2013, Coimbra: Almedina), 174. 
68 V. Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Comentário do Código de 
Processo Penal à luz da Constituição da República e da Convenção 
Europeia dos Direitos do Homem (2011, 4th edn., Lisboa: 
Universidade Católica Editora), 502. 
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case, and there is no need to consider the 
unconstitutionality of such an interpretation of article 
15. This is because, first, paragraph 1 of article 15 of 
the Cybercrime Law refers to the collection ‘of specific 
and determined computer data, stored in a specific 
computer system’, which, from the outset, excludes 
the collection of generic data in real time (e.g. 
passwords to be typed or online activity such as 
participation in chatrooms or visiting webpages). 
Secondly, the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 15 of 
the Cybercrime Law imply that obtaining access to the 
second computer system should be via the first 
system that is searched, and not from any other 
system used by the criminal investigator. Finally, 
article 15 is silent on the remote installation of any 
software in the subject’s computer. The article refers 
to the carrying out of the search ‘in that system’, and 
the rules governing searches provided for in the 
Criminal Procedure Code (particularly to paragraph 1 
of article 176 of this act), clearly indicate that the 
search is always carried out physically in the system 
itself, except as provided for in paragraph 5 of article 
15 of the Cybercrime Law, in which case the search is 
carried out remotely to another computer system, but 
typically from the system that was initially the subject 
of the search. 
This being so, the necessary conclusion is that these 
rules do not provide legal basis for the use of malware 
in the context of criminal investigations in a digital 
environment. 
The use of malware in the context of undercover 
operations in the digital environment 
A different problem, as mentioned briefly above, is 
the use of malware in the context of undercover 
operations in a digital environment. In an initiative 
that is notable for its usefulness69 but objectionable 
for lack of specific regulation, as well as to its 
excessively wide objective scope of application, the 
legislator introduced, in article 19 (1) of the 
Cybercrime Law, the undercover agent in the digital 
environment: 
Artigo 19.º Acções encobertas 
1 - É admissível o recurso às acções 
encobertas previstas na Lei n.º 101/2001, de 
                                                          
69 The legislator included it, it should be noted, without it being stated 
in the Convention on Cybercrime nor the Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA, of the Council, of February 24th, on attacks against 
information systems. 
25 de Agosto, nos termos aí previstos, no 
decurso de inquérito relativo aos seguintes 
crimes: 
a) Os previstos na presente lei; 
b) Os cometidos por meio de um 
sistema informático, quando lhes 
corresponda, em abstracto, pena de 
prisão de máximo superior a 5 anos 
ou, ainda que a pena seja inferior, e 
sendo dolosos, os crimes contra a 
liberdade e autodeterminação sexual 
nos casos em que os ofendidos sejam 
menores ou incapazes, a burla 
qualificada, a burla informática e nas 
comunicações, a discriminação racial, 
religiosa ou sexual, as infracções 
económico-financeiras, bem como os 
crimes consagrados no título iv do 
Código do Direito de Autor e dos 
Direitos Conexos. 
2 - Sendo necessário o recurso a meios e 
dispositivos informáticos observam-se, 
naquilo que for aplicável, as regras previstas 
para a intercepção de comunicações. 
Article 19 
1 – Undercover operations governed by Law 
no. 101/2001, of 25 August, shall be 
permitted in the manner specified therein, in 
the course of the investigation of criminal 
offences: 
a) Provided for herein; or 
b) Committed by means of a computer 
system, to which correspond, in 
abstract, a term of imprisonment with 
a maximum band of over 5 years or, 
even where lower penalty has been 
provided for, and as regards 
intentional offences, those against 
freedom and sexual self-
determination, in case victims are 
minors or incapacitated adults, 
qualified swindling, computer-related 
and communication forgery, racial, 
religious or sexual discrimination, 
economic and financial infringements, 
as well as criminal offences laid down 
in title IV of the Code of Copyright and 
Related Rights. 
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2 - Rules on interception of communications 
shall apply, as appropriate, where the resort 
to computer means and devices is required.70 
The provisions of paragraph 2 are formulated in 
extremely vague terms. The provision has not 
received particular attention from legal commentary, 
because it is commonly overlooked or seen as a 
provision that aims solely to provide the criminal 
police with certain technical means to intercept 
communications in the context of covert action in the 
digital environment. However, the practical 
application on an operational level of these ‘computer 
means and devices’ leads to the conclusion that this is 
(i) a new (secret)  means of obtaining evidence, and 
(ii) a particularly invasive (secret) method of obtaining 
evidence. 
The novelty of this method of obtaining evidence is 
clear from the fact that the ‘computer means and 
devices’ mentioned here do not fall within any of the 
means of obtaining evidence provided in the 
Portuguese criminal procedure law. This conclusion 
can be drawn from the fact that the Portuguese 
legislator felt the need to introduce a new rule to 
legitimize the use of ‘computer means and devices’, 
which means that this provision arose because of the 
failure of other provisions to legitimize the use of such 
‘computer means and devices’. 
A different view would imply that the Portuguese 
legislator had introduced a redundant and superfluous 
provision in this article, allowing for the use of an 
existing means of obtaining evidence in the context of 
undercover operations. This is a view that would not 
survive confrontation with the wording of the 
provision in question, given that it refers to the 
application of the rules on the interception of 
communications ‘as appropriate’, and not in its 
entirety (which means that some differences exist as 
to the applicability of these rules, and that no other 
rules exist that govern the use of ‘computer means 
and devices’). 
Regarding the particularly invasive character of the 
use of the ‘computer means and devices’, it suffices to 
say that its use is limited to the exceptional context in 
which covert actions are allowed and, even in this 
context, they can only be applied ‘if necessary’ (article 
19, paragraph 2, of the Cybercrime Law), or ‘if there 
are reasons to believe that the search is essential for 
the discovery of the truth or that proof would be 
                                                          
70 Translation from http://www.anacom.pt/ . 
otherwise impossible or very difficult to obtain’ 
(article 18, paragraph 2 of the Cybercrime Law). They 
are also serious enough to require a reasoned order 
by the investigative judge, upon request of the public 
prosecutor, in accordance with the provisions of the 
relevant articles. 
Taking into account that the resort to undercover 
operations is one of the most serious secret methods 
of criminal investigation, and the use of the most 
invasive means is only admissible when the use of a 
less invasive means is not possible, the very existence 
of a provision authorizing the use of a given secret 
method, subjecting its use to conditions of necessity 
and subsidiarity, indicates that it has to be a method 
that is even more invasive than undercover 
operations. 
This leads to question what these ‘computer means 
and devices’ are. The answer implies that they 
comprise means and devices that are not expressly 
provided for in the Portuguese criminal procedure 
law. Their exceptional, invasive and insidious nature 
can be compared to resorting to the undercover agent 
and further limited and regulated by the legal 
framework of interception of communications 
(though they do not fall within the concept of 
interception of communication). The only means that 
could fall within this category and still be qualified as 
‘computer means and devices’ is, in our view, the use 
of malware as a secret method of criminal 
investigation in the digital environment. 
Taking the legal framework of the undercover agent 
and the legal framework of interception of 
communications into account, the following 
requirements for the use of malware can be derived: 
1. A fitness for the purposes of the criminal 
prevention71 and repression, that is 
specifically identified and proportionate, both 
to those purposes and to the severity of the 
crime under investigation (article 3, paragraph 
1 of Law 101/2001 of 25 August). 
2. Well-founded suspicions that (i) one of the 
crimes defined in the Cybercrime Law has 
                                                          
71 The fitness for the purposes of prevention does not justify, in terms 
of the established law, the use of malware on covert operations of 
preventive nature (by contrast with those of a repressive nature), not 
least because these actions could seem to be permissible under the 
provisions of article 3, paragraph 4 of Law 101/2001 of 25 August, 
and article 18, paragraph 2, of the Cybercrime Law refers explicitly 
to ‘the interception and registration of computer data transmissions 
can only be authorized during the investigation’. 
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been committed, or (ii) of crimes committed 
by means of a computer system, to which 
correspond, in the abstract, a term of 
imprisonment with a maximum of over 5 
years or, even where lower penalty has been 
provided for; and regarding intentional 
offences, such as those against freedom and 
sexual self-determination, where victims are 
minors or incapacitated adults, qualified 
swindling, computer-related and 
communication forgery, racial, religious or 
sexual discrimination, economic and financial 
infringements, as well as criminal offences laid 
down in title IV of the Code of Copyright and 
Related Rights (article 19, paragraph 1, of the 
Cybercrime Law).  
3. Its use can only occur when there is reason 
to believe that the search is essential for the 
discovery of truth or evidence that is 
otherwise impossible or very difficult to 
obtain72 (article 18, paragraph 2, of the 
Cybercrime Law). 
4. The precedence of reasoned order by the 
investigative judge, upon request of the Public 
Prosecutor (article 18, paragraph 2 of the 
Cybercrime Law). 
5. The specification of the data sought, 
according to the specific needs of the 
investigation (article 18, paragraph 3 of the 
Cybercrime Law). 
Observing the requirements listed above, nothing 
appears to preclude, in terms of the established law, 
the use of malware as a means of obtaining evidence 
in the digital environment. 
The use of malware as a restriction on 
fundamental rights 
The use of malware as a means of obtaining evidence 
in criminal proceedings is, in some cases, essential. 
However, the framing of the topic as established in 
the Portuguese legislation is questionable. The 
installation of malware is, perhaps even more than 
the undercover agent, possibly the gravest means of 
                                                          
72 Arguably, the use of ‘computer means and devices’ in the context 
of covert operations of a preventive nature is unambiguously illegal. 
This is because these actions appear to be permissible under the 
provisions of article 3, paragraph 4 of Law 101/2001 of August 25th, 
but article 18, paragraph 2, of the Cybercrime Law states that ‘the 
interception and registration of computer data transmissions can 
only be authorized during the investigation’. 
obtaining evidence that is susceptible to being subject 
to legal control in a democratic state. The high level of 
social detriment that the remote monitoring of an 
individual’s private conduct when using his computer 
system represents – perhaps even accompanied by 
the recording of image and sounds – is a potentially 
unacceptable intrusion into the intangible core of 
personal intimacy. When combined with the 
encroachment on such fundamental rights as the 
preservation of the intimacy of private life, the 
inviolability of the domicile, confidentiality, image, 
word and moreover, the confidentiality and integrity 
of information systems, it is imperative that the legal 
establishment of such a provision is appropriately 
controlled, and that the features of the technical 
means to be used are limited in a clear and precise 
way, in compliance with the principle of 
proportionality.73 
It is not enough that a rule exists which generically – 
even if by referral to another legal framework – 
provides for the use of malware. The supremacy of 
law is legal precision,74 which is not compatible with 
the creation of a method of obtaining evidence of this 
nature when the legislation fails to provide for the 
functioning and purpose of the intrusion. 
Ultimately, the use of malware is not compatible – as 
is the case in article 19 (2) of the Cybercrime Law – 
with merely a reference to a given criminal procedure, 
followed by a generic referral ‘where it is applicable’ 
to a legal framework which, in turn, refers to another 
legal framework ‘with regard to all matters which are 
not contrary to’ that framework. On the contrary, to 
comply with the provisions of article 18 (2) of the 
Portuguese Constitution, it is necessary for the 
legislator to put in place an appropriate protective 
legal regime, providing the rule in question with 
special clarity and precision, explicitly pointing out the 
purposes and limits of the intrusiveness.75 By not 
doing so, the rule in question is unconstitutional – at 
least – by breach of the combined provisions of 
                                                          
73 Rodrigues, 474 – 475. 
74 Maria de Fátima Mata-Mouros, Juiz das Liberdades – 
Desconstrução de um Mito do Processo Penal (2011, Coimbra: 
Almedina), 38, 123 – 126 and 242 – 252. 
75 The European Court of Human Rights has already pointed out that 
a specific ‘quality of the law’ is required in order for citizens to 
understand the circumstances and conditions under which the public 
authorities can obtain redress, for which see by way of example: 
Malone v United Kingdom (ECHR, application no. 8691/79, of 2 
August 1984) and Vetter v France (ECHR, application no. 59842/00 
of 31 May 2005); see also Pradillo, Problemas Procesales de la 
Ciberdelincuencia, 174 – 175. 
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articles 18 (2),76 26 (2),77 and 178 of the Constitution of 
the Portuguese Republic. 
Inquiry of evidence obtained through the use of 
malware 
The analysis of the provisions of article 19 (2) of the 
Cybercrime Law poses a particularly serious problem, 
because it is intrinsically linked to the safeguarding of 
the guarantees of the defendant: that of the 
disclosure of the methods used to obtain the 
evidence. 
The use of ‘computer means and devices’ is, by virtue 
of its insertion in the article on undercover 
operations, subject to prior resort to the undercover 
agent. On the other hand, it is also conditional on the 
rules relating to the interception of communications. 
However, the Portuguese legal framework in force 
allows for the non-disclosure of the existence of an 
undercover operation at any time during the criminal 
procedure – including during trial – so that the 
defendant might never know that it ever occurred 
(this happens mainly for the safety of those involved 
in the undercover operation). In comparison, 
however, the legal framework for interception 
provided for in article 188 (8), which applies by means 
of article 18 (4) of the Cybercrime Law, provides as 
follows: 
8. A partir do encerramento do inquérito, o 
assistente e o arguido podem examinar os 
suportes técnicos das conversações ou 
                                                          
76 ‘A lei só pode restringir os direitos, liberdades e garantias nos 
casos expressamente previstos na Constituição, devendo as 
restrições limitar-se ao necessário para salvaguardar outros direitos 
ou interesses constitucionalmente protegidos.’ ‘The law may only 
restrict rights, freedoms and guarantees in cases expressly provided 
for in this Constitution, and such restrictions shall be limited to those 
needed to safeguard other rights and interests protected by this 
Constitution.’ Translation taken from 
http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/Constitution_VII
_revisao_definitive.pdf . 
77 ‘A lei estabelecerá garantias efectivas contra a utilização abusiva, 
ou contrária à dignidade humana, de informações relativas às 
pessoas e famílias.’ ‘The law shall lay down effective guarantees 
against the procurement and misuse of information concerning 
persons and families and its use contrary to human dignity.’ 
Translation taken from 
http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/Constitution_VII
_revisao_definitive.pdf . 
78 ‘Portugal é uma República soberana, baseada na dignidade da 
pessoa humana e na vontade popular e empenhada na construção 
de uma sociedade livre, justa e solidária.’ ‘Portugal shall be a 
sovereign Republic, based on the dignity of the human person and 
the will of the people and committed to building a free, just and 
solidary society.’ Translation taken from 
http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/Constitution_VII
_revisao_definitive.pdf . 
comunicações e obter, à sua custa, cópia das 
partes que pretendam transcrever para juntar 
ao processo, bem como dos relatórios 
previstos no n.º 1, até ao termo dos prazos 
previstos para requerer a abertura da 
instrução ou apresentar a contestação, 
respectivamente. 
8. From the termination of the investigation 
onwards, the assistant and the defendant may 
examine the technical medium for storing the 
conversations or communications and obtain, 
at their expense, a copy of the segments they 
wish to transcribe and add to the process, as 
well as of the reports provided for in 
paragraph 1, until the end of the deadlines for 
requesting the opening of the investigation or 
submitting a defence, respectively79. 
Thus, taking the provisions of article 19 (2) and article 
18 of the Cybercrime Law as including a reference to 
the legal framework of interception under article 188 
of the Criminal Procedure Code, the absurdity is that 
the existence of an undercover operation is not 
necessarily disclosed to the defendant, but the rules 
on interception will require that the defendant be 
provided with the technical medium used for storing 
the evidence that is collected using malware. This 
raises a question: if malware may only be used in the 
context of undercover operations, how can the 
existence of these operations not be disclosed and, at 
the same time, the technical medium used for storing 
the evidence that is collected using malware be 
provided to the defendant? 
This perplexity cannot justify the non-disclosure of the 
use of malware as a means of obtaining evidence in a 
given criminal proceeding. It cannot, because – when 
no particular issues of safety to those involved in 
undercover operations arise – any measures 
constituting an intrusive preliminary enquiry have to 
be noted in the case file under penalty of a violation 
of the constitutional guarantees of the defendant. 
Moreover, in the case of digital evidence, the 
authentication of the evidence is important if it is to 
be admitted into evidence. Its volatility and fragility 
imposes verification requirements of trustworthiness 
and assurance of the chain of custody that might not 
exist with proof commonly collected by undercover 
                                                          
79 Translation by the author. 
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agents.80 It is possible that the evidence might be 
contaminated, for example, by attacks against 
forensic examinations.81 Malware that is corrupted or 
affected by errors is liable to, or even able to diminish 
the trustworthiness of the evidence. Further, if the 
computer system itself in which the malware is 
installed is infected with other types of malware that 
allow a third party to control that computer system, 
this might lead to the defendant using the Trojan 
horse defence.82 
Since access to information through which digital 
evidence was collected is essential to its inquiry and 
subsequent verification of its trustworthiness, it 
remains possible to conclude that the probable 
concealment of the use of malware, as well as the 
omission of reference to the use of malware, might 
lead to the defendant not being able to examine the 
evidence so gathered. In such circumstances, this 
would breach his guarantee of defence and his right 
to be heard, as provided for in article 32 paragraphs 1 
and 5 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic: 
1. O processo criminal assegura todas as 
garantias de defesa, incluindo o recurso. 
… 
5. O processo criminal tem estrutura 
acusatória, estando a audiência de julgamento 
e os actos instrutórios que a lei determinar 
subordinados ao princípio do contraditório. 
1. Criminal proceedings shall ensure all 
necessary safeguards for the defence, 
including the right to appeal. 
… 
5. Criminal proceedings shall possess an 
accusatorial structure, and trial hearings and 
                                                          
80 On the authentication of digital data, see Stephen Mason, 
Electronic Evidence (3rd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012), 109 – 
147. 
81 Which have an undeserved presumption of trustworthiness: Gary 
C. Kessler, ‘Anti-Forensics and the Digital Investigator’, in Craig Valli 
and Andrew Woodward, eds, Proceedings of the 5th Australian 
Digital Forensics Conference (Perth: Edith Cowan University, 2007); 
on the undeserved presumption that a computer is reliable, see 
Stephen Mason, Electronic Evidence, chapter 5 and Stephen 
Mason, ‘Electronic evidence: A proposal to reform the presumption 
of reliability and hearsay’, Computer Law and Security Review, 
Volume 30 Issue 1 (February 2014), 80 – 84. 
82 Susan Brenner, Brian Carrier and Jef Henninger, ‘The Trojan 
horse defense in cybercrime cases’, Santa Clara Computer and High 
Technology Journal, Vol. 24 (2004), 1 – 53; and Jonathan Clough, 
Principles of Cybercrime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 34. 
such preliminary investigative acts as the law 
may require shall be subject to the principle of 
pleading and counter-pleading. 
Conclusions 
The use of malware as a means of obtaining criminal 
evidence is of unparalleled usefulness and 
effectiveness in the context of criminal investigations 
in a digital environment. Indeed, the advent of anti-
forensic techniques, allied to their ease of use, act to 
hamper how the police deal with cybercrime. In cases 
of more serious criminality, it is urgent to impose 
measures of a graver nature for their prosecution. The 
usefulness of these methods of obtaining evidence is 
made manifest not only by their use by several states 
worldwide, but by the development of supranational 
initiatives aimed at standardizing their requirements. 
In this respect, it appears that it was in order to 
establish the use of malware that the Portuguese 
legislator established the use of ‘computer means and 
devices’ in the context of undercover operations in a 
digital environment in article 19 (2) of the Cybercrime 
law. It did so, however, in a dubious fashion and with 
a severe shortage of legal clarity, foreseeability and 
precision, in violation of the provisions of articles 18 
(2), 26 (2) and 1 of the Constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic. This in turn allows for different 
interpretations of the legislation, which necessarily 
affects the level of constitutional guarantees provided 
to the defence in an area where the evidence is of 
particular weakness. 
The legislator should reconsider this legislation in the 
interests of setting out a fair and transparent means 
by which the use of malware can be used as a means 
of obtaining evidence in criminal proceedings, while 
allowing for the defendant to have access to 
information concerning the use of the relevant means, 
in compliance with article 32 paragraphs 1 and 5 of 
the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. 
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